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The Delicate Balance:  
Reconciling Privacy Protection 
With the Freedom of Information Principle 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN D. McCAMUS 
 
 
 
 
 
Many of the major western democracies have enacted freedom of information 
legislation in recent years.  The author argues that these legislative schemes have not 
yet successfully resolved the tension between the desire for greater openness which 
these schemes manifest and a concern to protect personal privacy.  The author 
compares the approaches taken in federal legislation in Canada and the U.S. and 
concludes that the former scheme permits undue sensitivity to privacy protection 
concerns to undermine the access scheme.  The author concludes, however, that the 
American "balancing test," though preferable, could be much improved by the 
adoption of more specific criteria for achieving an appropriate balance, a number of 
which are articulated in this article. 
 
 
 
In recent years, a number of the older democracies of the English-speaking world and of 
continental Europe have enacted freedom of information legislation. Developments in 
continental Europe have been very much influenced by the Swedish experience with 
access laws, stretching back over the past two centuries. 
1 
In the English-speaking 
countries, however, the major influence has undoubtedly been American experience with 
its federal Freedom of Information Act.
2 
At the same time, public policy in these 
countries manifests an increasing sensitivity to the privacy protection issue.3 This article 
is concerned with the problem of legislative design thrown up by the apparent conflict 
between these disparate objectives of government information policy. 
The freedom of information principle holds that, generally speaking, every citizen 
should have the right to obtain access to government records.  The underlying rationales 
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most frequently offered in support of the principle are, first, that the right of access will 
heighten the accountability of government and its agencies to the electorate; second, that 
it will enable interested citizens to contribute more effectively to debate on important 
questions of public policy; and, third, that it will conduce to fairness in administrative 
decision-making processes affecting individuals.
4
 
The protection of privacy principle, on the other hand, holds in part at least that 
individuals should, generally speaking, have some control over the use made by others, 
especially government agencies, of information concerning themselves.  Thus, one of 
the cardinal principles of privacy protection is that personal information acquired for 
one purpose should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the 
individual to whom the information pertains.  Absolute adherence to this principle is 
thought to be unworkable in practical terms and the principle is therefore typically 
hedged in by various exceptions in privacy protection legislation.  Nonetheless, the 
principle represents the statement of an ideal from which the exceptions are taken. The 
philosophy underlying the privacy protection concern links personal autonomy to the 
control of data concerning oneself and suggests that the modern acceleration of 
personal data collection, especially by government agencies, carries with it a potential 
threat to a valued and fundamental aspect of our traditional freedoms.
5
 
When attention is drawn to government records containing personal information 
concerning identifiable individuals, it is obvious that these two philosophies and 
legislation based upon them are capable of generating conflict.  At the risk of 
belaboring the obvious, a few illustrations of the problem may be listed: 
 
1. A journalist seeks access to government records that will reveal the salaries of the 
chief executive officers of all government-owned corporations. 
 
2. A researcher doing a study of military justice seeks access to records of decisions 
in disciplinary matters. 
 
3. A journalist, who believes that a particular agency has been lax in dealing with a 
particular problem, seeks access to records which reveal the actions taken by 
responsible officials. 
 
4. A convicted offender, released from prison under supervision, commits an 
offence of violence.  A journalist seeks access to letters written in support of the 
prisoner's release. 
 
5. A journalist seeks access to government records which he believes will reveal 
that a public servant has engaged in improper financial dealings with public 
funds. 
 
One could easily multiply examples of this kind.  In each case, the individual 
seeking access wishes to scrutinize some aspect of the conduct of public business.  In 
some cases, this will involve disclosure of information pertaining to public officials.  In 
others, it will involve disclosure of information concerning ordinary citizens.  In 
each instance, the subject of the information can plausibly raise a privacy protection 
concern.  One man's freedom of information is another man's invasion of privacy. 
This tension between the freedom of information and privacy protection principles 
creates  essentially  three  policy  problems  for  those  who  are engaged  in  designing 
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legislated freedom of information and privacy protection schemes. First, there arises the 
problem of institutional design. In what institutional forum should conflicts of this kind 
be resolved?  In the courts?  In the legislature?  In the bureaucracy? Second, wherever 
these problems are to be addressed, what guidance can be given to those saddled 
with the resolution of such conflicts? This is the question of substantive policy. How, if 
at all, can these two conflicting values be reconciled? In this article, I address these two 
questions against the background of a comparative analysis of Canadian and American 
freedom of information and privacy protection statutes and the proposals of the 
Ontario Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, which are 
set forth in the Commission's 1980 Report, Public Government for Private People, and 
which form the basis of a freedom of information bill recently introduced by the  
Government of Ontario.
6
 
A third range of problems, essentially technical in nature, will not be addressed here. 
These problems arise from the potential for conflict between the general rights of access 
conferred by freedom of information laws and the more particular rights of access 
conferred by privacy protection laws which enable  individuals to obtain access to 
information concerning themselves. It is no easy task to design access rights within these 
two different contexts which will co-exist harmoniously, and this has proven to be a 
continuing problem in the American federal experience.
7 
Suffice to say that in the 
Canadian context, these problems appear to have been for the most part resolved in the 
drafting of the federal Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, as enacted in June 
of 1982.
8
 
 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEM: 
THE LOCUS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
Since conflict between the competing values of access to information and personal 
privacy appears inevitable, what is the ideal institutional location for the power to 
provide an authoritative resolution of these conflicts? The answer provided by the 
American federal legislation is that ultimate recourse is to be taken to the courts through 
judicial review of agency decisions to deny access. The U.S. Freedom of Information 
Act 
9 
requires that federal government agencies make their records available to "any 
person" unless the records fall within one of nine exceptions of this general rule. The 
exception of relevance to the present discussion is that agencies may refuse to disclose 
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
10 
An individual who is denied access 
to a government record on the basis of the agency's conclusion that disclosure would be 
an unwarranted invasion of privacy, may challenge the agency's decision in the federal 
courts. The court will, in turn, reach its own conclusion as to whether or not the record is 
exempt from disclosure and, if satisfied that the public interest in access outweighs the 
individual data subject's interest in privacy, will order disclosure of the document in 
question. 
The U.S. Privacy Act
11 
is drafted to function consistently with the access scheme. 
Thus, although the Act generally prohibits disclosure of personal data without the 
consent of the data subject, there are some exceptions to this general rule and one of 
them permits disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Thus, the Freedom of 
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Information Act confers a right of access upon the requestor, the content of which is 
subject to judicial determination, and the Privacy Act confers a right of non-disclosure on 
the data subject, the content of which can again be tested in the courts. For the litigation-
averse public servant, a premium is quite obviously placed on sound judgment. When 
confronted with a request for access to a record containing personal information, the 
agency confronts the twin possibilities that if it denies access it may be sued under the 
Freedom of Information Act whereas if it grants access, it may be sued under the Privacy 
Act. Nonetheless, the American scheme does provide an independent source of 
authoritative advice on the resolution of the tension between access and privacy values. It 
is not at all surprising that a sophisticated jurisprudence on this question is emerging in 
the American case law. 
12
 
Under the Canadian federal legislation, by way of contrast, reconciliation of the 
access and privacy values is left essentially to the discretion of public officials. Thus, 
although the Access to Information Act 14 confers a broad right of access to government 
records- a right which is for the most part subject to enforcement by the courts 
14
-it 
exempts from this right access to records containing "personal information," this latter 
concept being very broadly defined indeed in the statute. 
15 
This definition is itself 
subject to certain limited exceptions with the result that a very narrowly-conceived 
right of access to records containing personal information is contained in the Access 
to Information Act. As a general rule, however, access to such records is prohibited 
by the statute, 
16 
although this prohibition is, in turn, made subject to whatever 
disclosures are permitted under Section 8 of the Privacy Act. The latter provision is the 
section of the Privacy Act which purports to control disclosure of personal 
information. Although it begins by stipulating that personal information shall not be 
disclosed without the consent of the individual data subject, it confers a series of 
discretionary powers on agencies to disclose information to a variety of individuals for 
a variety of purposes and concludes, in sub-section (m), that an agency has a discretion 
to disclose: 
 
for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution, 
 
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from 
disclosure, or 
 
(ii) disclosure would  clearly  benefit  the individual  to  whom  the  information relates 
 
The language of sub-paragraph (i) evinces a strong bias in favor of privacy protection, in 
contrast to the American provision which evinces strong support for the access principle, 
but this is a point to which we shall return in the next section of this article. The 
important point for present purposes is that, as far as personal information is concerned, 
essentially no right of access is conferred upon individuals seeking access and no right to 
control disclosure is conferred upon those who wish to prevent it. It is true that the two 
statutes both establish public officials, the Information Commissioner and the Privacy 
Commissioner respectively, whose mandates include a duty to entertain complaints 
concerning proposed withholdings or disclosures under either statute. However, the 
Commissioners possess only the powers of an ombudsman-that is, they can make 
recommendations but cannot compel an agency to withhold or disclose. 
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In sharp contrast to the American scheme, then, the Canadian statute addresses the 
problem of resolving the conflict between access and privacy by simply suppressing it 
into the level of administrative discretion and refusing to confer rights of access and 
rights to prevent improper disclosure. 
In adopting this approach, the Canadian scheme has, in my view, both substantially 
Undermined the access rights conferred by the Access to Information Act and 
significantly depreciated the degree of privacy protection afforded by the Privacy Act. As 
far as the access right is concerned, it should be emphasized that a very substantial 
percentage of government records must contain information pertaining to identifiable 
individuals which would bring them within the sweep of the far-reaching definition of 
personal information contained in these statutes. To confer so broad a discretion on the 
federal bureaucracy to withhold or disclose such information is to simply ignore the basic 
premise of freedom of information legislation, i.e., the conferral of a right of access on 
the public at large. 
If it is the point of the federal Canadian scheme to sacrifice freedom of information in 
order to effect a high level of privacy protection, then it must be said that the federal 
bureaucracy is also not the most suitable instrument for the achievement of this 
objective. Public officials are placed in a position of conflict of interest when asked to 
disclose information which might facilitate effective public scrutiny of their performance. 
It may well be in the interests of a particular department to disclose information and 
demonstrate that it has conducted public affairs in a perfectly sound and responsible 
fashion, notwithstanding the substantial invasion of the privacy of identifiable indi- 
viduals which may result from disclosure. 
A leading American decision under the Freedom of Information Act illustrates the 
problem.  In  Sonderegger  v.  United States Department  of  the  lnterior,
17   
certain 
journalists sought access to claims files arising in the context of special federal assistance 
programs for the victims of a flood which had devastated a town in Idaho. The 
journalists obviously wished to detect malfeasance in the handling of such claims and the 
federal agency was quite willing to permit full disclosure. The flood victims, on the other 
hand, felt that disclosure would substantially invade their privacy, inasmuch as each 
claim represented essentially the net worth of the individual in question. As well, they felt 
that disclosure would prove to be very stressful for a community which was already 
enduring considerable stress in attempting to re-establish itself after this disaster. Expert 
evidence was provided by a psychologist who was working with the local committee, 
confirming this prognostication. The federal court decided that the public interest in 
disclosure was significantly outweighed by the resulting invasion of the privacy of the 
plaintiff townspeople and, thus, overruled the decision of the agency to permit 
disclosure. One can understand that public officials are anxious to dispel unfair 
allegations of wrongdoing. My point simply is that there will be situations in which the 
question of disclosure cannot be approached in a completely disinterested fashion. The 
enactment of a freedom of information statute represents an acknowledgement of this 
plain fact and the adoption of a remedy which places the decision to disclose the 
document effectively beyond the powers of the officials concerned. 
A substantial problem with the Canadian scheme, then, is that it establishes a far- 
reaching domain of discretionary power which, at one and the same time, creates the risk 
that access to records will be denied in order to preclude appropriate scrutiny of public 
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affairs on the pretext that disclosure will unfairly invade the privacy of data subjects and, 
on the other hand, the risk that public officials concerned to clear their good names will 
be tempted to do so, notwithstanding the fact that disclosure will affect a substantial 
invasion of the personal privacy of individuals. 
A further problem with the Canadian scheme is that it conduces to a wilderness of 
inconsistent decision-making from one department and governmental unit to the next. 
One finds little or no guidance in the statute itself as to how the discretion to disclose 
should be exercised. More surprisingly, perhaps neither does one find assistance in the 
Treasury Board's Interim Policy Guide which sets forth extensive guidance for public 
officials on the proper interpretation and implementation of other aspects of the Access 
to Information Act and the Privacy Act. 
A more sympathetic observer of the Canadian scheme might argue that the problem 
is, after all, an intractable one and suggest that the legislation in its current form will at 
least provide a splendid opportunity for the Information Commissioner and the Privacy 
Commissioner  to  investigate  matters  of  this  kind  and  assist  the  bureaucracy  in 
developing helpful guidelines for resolving conflicts of this kind. It is difficult to discern, 
however, that either Commissioner will have a substantial role in dealing with this issue. 
As far as the Information Commissioner is concerned, if the information in question 
clearly falls within the definition of personal information, and surely this will often be so, 
there does not appear to be much for her to say, other than that the record in question is, 
indeed,  exempt  from  the  access  scheme.  As  far  as  the  Privacy  Commissioner  is 
concerned, provided that the public official in question has, in good faith, weighed the 
public interest in disclosure against the privacy value, it is again difficult to see that much 
remains  to be said by the Commissioner.  It may well  be,  however,  that  given the 
importance of this question and the absence of any other source of guidance, either or 
both Commissioners will see fit to comment either on the inadequacies of the current 
legislative scheme or on the deficient exercise of the discretion which is unquestionably 
conferred upon public officials by it. 
Two explanations may be offered for the Canadian reluctance to extend judicial 
review into the area of records containing personal data. First, it may be felt that this is 
an attempt to avoid burdening data subjects with either the cost or the inconvenience of 
participation in judicial review. Second, it may be thought that so important a question 
as this ought not be simply remitted to the courts. 
With respect to the first point, a preferable solution would have been to endow the 
Privacy Commissioner with the power to bear the cost of litigation of this kind on behalf 
of the data subject. One of the great innovations of the Access to Information and 
Privacy Acts was to confer a power of this kind on both the Information Commissioner 
and the Privacy Commissioner in the context of access requests. Where either 
Commissioner believes that the information should be made available over the objection 
of the governmental institution in question, the Commissioner is entitled to carry 
ligitation brought on behalf of the requester and thus provide an authoritative resolution 
of the dispute which is cost free to the requester. 
18 
The Privacy Commissioner could have 
been similarly empowered to provide cost-free litigious protection to the data subject. 
With respect to the appropriateness of the courts as the instrumentality for resolving 
these conflicts, it would appear that the only other alternative to the bureaucracy itself 
would be the legislative branch of government. Indeed, many statutes which establish 
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administrative mechanisms requiring the collection of personal data do explicitly provide 
for the protection of the data. While the notion of resort to the legislature has an obvious 
democratic appeal in this context, two reservations about the capacity of the legislature 
in a parliamentary system of government to deal effectively with these issues must be 
registered. First, a legislature dominated by a majority party is easily seen to be subject to 
a version of the same conflict of interest that plagues the executive branch. The Access to 
Information Act notwithstanding, a Canadian government is not likely to vigorously 
pursue a policy of drafting legislation to ensure effective scrutiny of its own conduct of 
public affairs. Second, it should be noted that many legislative provisions of this kind are 
currently to be found in the statute book and, consistently with the hypothesis just stated, 
they typically provide that there is to be no access whatsoever to the data in question. 
The concern that such provisions may conduce to too much secrecy is manifested in 
Section 24 of the Access to Information Act, which requires that all such provisions be 
reviewed by a Parliamentary Committee within three years of the enactment of the 
Access to Information Act. Accepting, as I do, that provisions of this kind relating to 
personal data were often enacted purely for privacy protection purposes, they are 
typically drafted without any apparent sensitivity to the desirability of permitting some 
forms of access to even reasonably sensitive data. Thus, as David Flaherty demonstrated 
in a paper prepared for the Ontario Commission, much useful medical research has been 
thwarted by the existence of provisions of this kind. 
19 
Leaving these reservations aside, 
however, it nonetheless is true that one possible response to the concern that the courts 
should not be given too much discretion in matters of this kind would be to specifically 
enact access and disclosure schemes to deal with specific information contexts. 
As a more general matter, however, there are a number of difficulties inherent in the 
current Canadian model of administrative discretion and in a general referral to the 
legislature. This, together with what appears to be reasonably positive American 
experience, suggests that judicial review is the most attractive of the alternatives. The 
Ontario proposals and the recently introduced Ontario bill, attempt to improve on the 
U.S. scheme by providing for a binding determination by an independent administrative 
tribunal prior to ultimate recourse to judicial review. 
20 
Whether the reconciliation of 
privacy and access principles is to be located in the legislature or in the courts or the 
bureaucracy, or perhaps all three, the difficult question that remains, and to which we 
now turn, is how one should approach the task of effecting that reconciliation in 
analytical terms. 
 
 
THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM: 
ACHIEVING AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE 
 
Again, the American and Canadian models provide interesting points of contrast. As has 
been indicated, the American statute provides a right of access unless disclosure of 
personal data would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." The 
Canadian statute, on the other hand, provides for essentially no right of access, but for 
the right to obtain documents containing information in three categories: 
 
I. Certain  basic  information  concerning  the contracts  of employment  of  public 
servants and their opinions or views given in the course of employment; 
8 
 
 
2. Similar information concerning individuals performing services for a government 
institution under contract; and 
 
3. Information "relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including 
the granting of a licence or permit." 
21
 
 
 
Presumably, the draftsmen of the Canadian statute thought that a more precise 
provision of this kind had some advantages over the vague standard of the American 
"clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" test. Nonetheless, the difficulties created by a 
refusal to embrace a balancing test of some kind are manifest in this provision. As an 
access right, the Canadian provision leaves much to be desired. The illustrations with 
which I began this article were carefully chosen with this point in mind. They are all 
situations in which, in my view, a strong claim for access can be made and they are all 
situations in which access would be granted under the American scheme, notwithstand- 
ing the fact that all involve disclosure of personal information.
22 
They are also all 
situations in which no access would be given as right under the Canadian statute. 
From  the  privacy  protection  point  of  view,  the  Canadian  provision  is also  
flawed.  Although one understands the obvious rationale for requiring disclosure of 
information relating to discretionary benefits, such as licences, it should be noted that 
most welfare schemes, perhaps all such schemes, contain modest discretionary features. 
Thus, whether we speak of unemployment insurance benefits or widows' benefits 
under veterans' assistance legislation, or the various forms of assistance rendered to those 
suffering from mental or physical disabilities, some financial benefits typically remain 
within a discretionary category. There appears to be no merit whatsoever in 
conferring, as the Canadian statute does, a right of access to personal data pertaining 
to discretionary benefits of this particular kind. 
A strong case can be made, then, for the desirability of a balancing test of some kind. 
Indeed, this is accepted in the Canadian statute to the extent that apart from the limited 
right of access to personal data conferred in the Access to Information Act, all other 
disclosures are to be made-though purely as a matter of administrative discretion-on 
the basis of a balancing test. The question that remains to be considered is how this 
balancing test should ideally be designed. Before offering some suggestions to this end, 
two preliminary points can usefully be addressed. 
First  it  should  be  noted  that  to  some  extent  the  conflict  between  freedom  of 
information and privacy protection can be resolved by deleting the names of identifiable 
individuals before releasing the requested documents. Anonymous data of this kind will 
often meet the needs of the requester and retard, if not completely eliminate, the risk of 
privacy invasion. As the leading U.S. case of U.S. Department  of the Air Force v. Rose 
23 
indicates, however, even where some risk of identification or privacy invasion remains, 
deletion of names may take the task of balancing the public interest in access against the 
risk of privacy invasion an easier one. In Rose, legal researchers engaged in a study of 
military discipline sought access to records relating to Air Force disciplinary proceed- 
ings. They conceded that access to records with names deleted would be sufficient for 
their purpose but it was objected by the defendant that even with names deleted, it would 
be possible in many instances for individuals who were familiar with the incidents in 
question to identify the person disciplined. The federal court held that although this risk 
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was present, it was outweighed in the present case by the public interest in the ability of 
outsiders to scrutinize this area of government activity. 
In any case where the deletion of names or other identifying detail prevents the 
identification of individuals, the requester should be able to rely upon the principle of 
severability, i.e., the principle embraced by both the American and Canadian access 
statutes that the government must disclose any reasonably severable portion of a 
requested document that is not covered by one of the exemptions.
24 
One of the lessons of 
the Rose case, however, is that even where the elimination of identifiability cannot be 
achieved in this way, one may nonetheless reduce the risk of privacy invasion to the point 
where it is outweighed by the public interest in access. 
A second point which has surfaced in the American case law applying the "clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy" test is whether the specific use of the personal data 
proposed by the requester is to be relied upon as the basis for testing the public interest in 
disclosure. Thus, where the requester has some highly beneficial medical or other research 
in mind, is it the potential benefit of such research that should be weighed against the 
invasion of privacy or, inasmuch as disclosure is likely to mean that the personal data can 
have a wider circulation in the public domain, should the particular use of the requester be 
ignored? In the U.S. experience and literature, discussion of this issue has been provoked 
by the decision in Getman v. N LRB,
25 
a case in which certain law professors specializing in 
labor relations were allowed access to lists of employees eligible to vote in union 
representation elections in order to carry out research on certain policies of the U.S. 
National Labor Relations Board relating to the certification process. The court in Getman 
awarded access to the requesters specifically for the purpose of this project, and on the faith 
of an undertaking by them that they would not disclose the names of the individuals to 
anyone else. It is not at all evident that the disclosure of these names to the public at large 
would be sustained. Indeed, given the apparent absence of any public benefit from such 
disclosure, this would likely be characterized as an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy-hence the Getman court's concern that the requesters make no further disclosure 
of the employee lists. In Getman, then, the Court was prepared to grant limited access to 
the particular requester, even though access to the public at large would be inappropriate. 
The debate stimulated by Getman has been rather intense.
26 
Some have objected to the 
decision on the grounds that inasmuch as the Freedom of lnformation Act provides access 
to "any person," the  particular  requester's  "need  to  know" ought  to be considered 
irrelevant. Others have given a policy justification for this reading of the statute which, to 
my mind at least, is compelling. If one does embrace a "need to know" concept in some of 
this case law, it is likely to spread its influence throughout the case law dealing with the 
conflict between freedom of information and privacy protection and very substantially 
undermine the value of the access right. Moreover, it seems impractical to contemplate a 
general practice of trying to restrain further disclosures of  information released to 
requesters under the Freedom of Information Act. A far better solution, it seems to me, 
and one that was in fact proposed in the report of the Ontario Commission, and adopted in 
the recent Ontario bill is to treat the problem of access for research purposes as a separate 
problem and to devise a mechanism for providing access to personal data for the research 
community. 
27
 
Turning then to the central question, how is one to strike a balance between freedom 
of information and privacy protection, the question essentially is whether one can do any 
10 
 
 
more by way of providing guidance to decision-makers than to offer the general 
instruction provided, albeit in significantly different terms, by both the American and 
Canadian statutes that the decision-maker should carefully weigh the public interest in 
disclosure against the personal interest in privacy protection. My own view is that one 
can substantially improve on this approach by attempting to articulate a variety of more 
explicit factors that should be taken into account by someone undertaking the task of 
reconciling these two interests. The following propositions derive, in the main, from 
discussion set forth in the Ontario Report 
28 
to the same general effect and from a reading 
of the American case law applying the "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" test. 
I would suggest that the following factors should be considered pertinent in attempting 
to balance these conflicting interests: 
 
A. ls access to the information necessary to enable an individual to accomplish 
any of the objectives underlying freedom of information legislation, i.e., 
effective scrutiny of the activity of government institutions, effective participa- 
tion in discussion concerning public affairs and increased fairness in adminis- 
trative decision-making affecting individuals? 
 
As I have already indicated, it may be asking too much of human nature to allow public 
officials themselves to determine whether a particular request is well suited to 
accomplish these objectives. The issues raised by these criteria for access are not 
particularly subtle, however, and could be answered with some confidence by third 
parties in most instances. 
 
B.  Is access to the information in question likely to make a positive contribution to 
the promotion of public health or safety? 
 
In addition to the generally accepted political rationales articulated in point (A), the 
granting of access to information with health and safety objectives in view appears to be 
accepted as a desirable spinoff of freedom of information legislation. Requests  put 
forward for these reasons offer a particularly  compelling interest in access. 
 
C.  Will access to the information in question promote an informed choice in the 
purchase of goods and services? 
 
Again, this appears to be a desirable incidental spinoff of freedom of information 
schemes. It is of no little interest that items (B) and (C) both find some philosophical 
support in Section 20 of the Canadian Access to Information Act which explicitly 
provides for access to the results of product and environmental testing and, more 
generally, confers upon government institutions a discretion to disclose commercial 
information if the public interest in public health, public safety or protection of the 
environment outweighs the harm that might result to the commercial party to whom the 
information pertains. 
 
D. Will the granting of access have the effect of benefiting the individual who is the 
subject of the information disclosed? 
 
There may well be situations where the individual seeking access has only in mind the 
conferral of some benefit on the data subject and the case for disclosure in such circum- 
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stances is obviously compelling. This consideration is explicitly set forth in Section 8(m) 
of the Privacy Act as a basis for exercising the discretion to disclose. 
 
E. Is the information of a kind which is normally disclosed in other contexts? 
 
The fourth illustration set forth at the beginning of this article asked whether letters 
written in support of the release of a prisoner should be available to the public. These 
were the facts of a decision under the American Act, Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. 
U.S. Department  of  Justice,29   in  which  the court  reasoned  that  inasmuch  as such 
individuals are acting, in a sense, as character witnesses for the convicted person, 
something they would normally be required to do in a public hearing, their letters should 
be made available. Here, as elsewhere in legal analysis, fruitful analogy is an important 
source of guidance. 
A number of factors may be taken to weigh in the balance against disclosure: 
 
F. Will access to the information frustrate the objectives of the statutory scheme 
under which the information was originally collected? 
 
There may well be situations, for example, where conciliation procedures are mandated 
by a statute, where a disclosure of records will render the governmental institution in 
question effectively unable to carry out its assigned statutory task. Surely this would 
weigh heavily against disclosure. 
 
G. ls the personal information of an especially sensitive kind? 
 
It is possible to identify types of information such as medical information or information 
relating to eligibility for social service or welfare benefits, the disclosure of which would 
be seen by the average data subject as an especially grievous invasion of privacy. 
30
 
 
H. ls the information unlikely to be accurate or reliable? 
 
The probability that personal data will be accurate may vary quite considerably with the 
circumstances under which it is gathered or submitted, and the safeguards established or 
verification procedures adopted by the government institution in question. The likeli- 
hood of circulating inaccurate information should weigh against a decision to disclose. 
 
I.   Is  there  some  prospect  that  the  data  subject  will  suffer  substantial  harm, 
pecuniary or otherwise, as a result of the disclosure? 
 
Some invasions of privacy may serve not only to embarrass or otherwise diminish the 
sense of privacy of the individual data subject, but also cause substantial harm of one 
sort or another. This, again, should weigh against disclosure. 
 
J.   Was  the  information  submitted  on  the  basis  of an expectation,  tacit  or 
otherwise, that it would be treated in a confidential fashion? 
 
American courts have suggested that, although an undertaking of confidentiality should 
weigh heavily against disclosure, it should merely be a factor taken into account in deter- 
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mining whether or not to make the information available.
31 
Presumably such under- 
takings would normally be adhered to but perhaps not, for example, where the 
individual who initially supplied the information did not rely on the undertaking in any 
meaningful sense or was in any event by law to submit the information in question. 
No doubt intimate experience with the functioning of freedom of information and 
privacy protection schemes would enable one to offer further propositions of this kind. 
The Ontario Commission recommended a rather elaborate statutory provision 
32 
in 
which  a  number  of  the foregoing  propositions  were  stated  as presumptions  to  be 
employed in the application of the balancing test and, I confess, I remain convinced that 
this is an attractive solution to the problem presented in this article. The Ontario bill 
contains a slightly revised version of this provision. 
33 
At the very least, however, it seems 
to me that the articulation of principles of this kind should be of assistance to those 
charged with the task of applying the more vague standards set forth in the American 
and Canadian legislation. 
Privacy is an important but surely not an absolute value, and one which must compete 
with other values such as the public interest in access to government information. There 
is a serious danger that the concern to protect privacy will be allowed to submerge the 
access value, as the virtually wholesale exclusion of personal information from the 
Canadian Access to Information Act amply demonstrates. It is not too much to suggest 
that undue deference to the privacy value has substantially undermined the value of the 
Canadian access scheme. In remitting the question of whether to disclose personal 
information to the realm of discretionary power, the draftsmen of the Canadian scheme 
shied away from the task of reconciling these conflicting values. The Ontario bill, on the 
other hand, may be thought to represent a substantial improvement on the American 
experience. In this, and in other respects, the Ontario bill is a pioneering effort, worthy of 
serious attention by all who take an interest in freedom of information and privacy 
protection issues. 
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